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But, in theory, the higher returns should
boost investor demand for stocks with
relatively large local ownership—espe-
cially if the stocks are of small compa-
nies—driving up their price and elimi-
nating the return premium. History sug-
gests at least one possible solution to
this conundrum: Most investors may not
yet know how to use this information to
their beneﬁt.  
Some analysts believe such was the
case with the “January effect,” ﬁrst dis-
cussed in the late 1970s. Researchers
found that investors would sell losing
stocks at the end of the year in order to
offset capital gains taxes and then buy
them back in January, driving up that
month’s returns. Knowledgeable
investors could buy in December and
sell in January, making an easy proﬁt.
According to more recent research, how-
ever, the January effect has diminished
somewhat as individual investors have
learned the game and better information
technology has made it easier and faster
for them to manage their own trades.
Will the local premium found by
Ivkovich and Weisbenner follow a similar
path? Currently, personal investors typi-
cally invest in only a couple of local pub-
licly held ﬁrms, and few rigorously com-
pute their gains and losses, so the bene-
ﬁts from local stock ownership may not
be that obvious. Additionally, the infor-
mation necessary to identify the best
local stocks is harder to get. It is difﬁcult
for investors to know who the smart
locals are, and other effects such as
state taxes and trading regulations may
complicate the process.
Still, as Internet communications and
online databases become more sophisti-
cated, it may become easier for investors
to perform the calculations. Also, ﬁrms
may start to advertise the percentage of
local residents who own shares of their
company if they think it will encourage
other investors to buy their stock. In the
long run, the opportunity for ﬁnancial
gain may vanish as investors catch on;
in the short run, investors may have
much to gain by thinking local. 
—Brad Hershbein
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he prospect of deflation—a
falling overall price level—received
a fair amount of attention during
late 2002 and 2003. Prompted by
a steady decline in the core rate of
inflation to levels not reached since
the early 1960s, many people began
to wonder about the economic con-
sequences when the inflation rate
drops below zero. Although the on-
going economic recovery suggests
that there is a low probability of de-
flation in the near future, questions
about the impact of falling prices are
worth considering. 
At  first  glance,  falling  prices
might  seem  like  a  good  thing.
Who wouldn’t want the prices of
the things he or she buys to be
cheaper? But in a period of defla-
tion, overall prices drop—includ-
ing  the  price  of  labor  (wages),
houses and other assets, and most
goods and services. In the simplest
example of deflation, all prices and
wages fall at the same rate. In this
instance, the purchasing power of
incomes and the relationship be-
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tween the prices of different goods (hamburger versus steak, for ex-
ample) would not change. 
One classic argument for deflation is that anyone holding cash ben-
efits, since a dollar bill buys more as prices fall. However, it is worth
noting that no developed country in the twentieth century has ever
intentionally moved to a negative rate of inflation and decided to stay
there. (Japan’s recent experience with declining prices is probably best
described as unintentionally moving to deflation and being stuck
there, rather than deciding to stay). Apparently, countries behave as
if the costs of deflation outweigh any of its benefits. 
It also means that we have no post-WWII examples from which
to draw conclusions about how damaging the costs would actually be.
Nonetheless, we can make a rough assessment by first considering
the short-run costs of getting to deflation and then the long-run costs
that would be permanently incurred by an economy that persistent-
ly operates with falling prices.
THE TRANSITION COSTS
Transition costs arise in moving from an economy with a positive rate
of inflation to one where prices are falling. This can happen either
through a deliberate macro policy designed to reduce inflation or less
deliberately when economic forces reduce inflation without an ef-
fective policy counterbalance. While the term “transition” might sug-
gest that these costs are trivial, in practice they can be large. 
Significant economic weakness is typically what precipitates defla-
tion. Deflation is usually triggered by a very weak economy, and
the cost of such a period of economic weakness can be extremely se-
rious. We knew this even before the recent 14-year Japanese episode,
but that experience makes the case even more vividly—disinflat-
ing requires a cost in lost output. If historical relationships hold,
the short-run cost of getting the United States economy from an in-
flation rate of 2 percent to a deflation rate of –2 percent, for exam-
ple, would be about $1.4 trillion in lost output—or about 13 percent
of one year’s GDP. 
The ﬁnancial system needs time to adjust to falling prices. Our mod-
ern financial system has evolved to accommodate steadily rising
prices. Long-term contracts have been written under the assump-
tion of a low but positive rate of inflation for the foreseeable future.
Any unanticipated change in the inflation rate (or an expected change
with only a small lead time) would require that these arrangements
adjust. While it’s difficult to know exactly how long such an adjust-
ment would take, all the changes would probably not occur immedi-
ately. In the meantime, debtors would face increasing real debt pay-
ments—the opposite of what all parties assumed when the contracts
were signed. Collateral values would decline over time. During an
economic contraction, this would likely lead to an even further rise
in delinquency and default rates, increasing the number of nonper-
forming loans and eroding bank balance sheets—and raising the costs
of the transition even more.
Although financial instruments and institutions eventually might
adjust to an economy with falling prices, in the short run, these ad-
justments would contribute to economic weakness and increase the
cost of moving the economy to deflation. And there are reasons to
think that financial arrangements would have trouble adjusting com-
pletely, especially in the transition. For example, since people seem
to care more about nominal losses than equivalent nominal gains, it
might be difficult to get people to hold financial instruments that build
in nominal declines in value in order to adjust to deflation.  
Nominal wages (money wages not adjusted for inﬂation) tend not to
fall. This may be an artifact of living with 60 years of post-war infla-
tion where workers are hesitant to accept wage cuts, or it may be a
more fundamental psychological attribute that people simply dislike
seeing their paychecks shrink. John Maynard Keynes developed his
early theories of downwardly sticky wages in the 1930s, a period not
characterized by long-term inflation, suggesting that this tendency
is not only the result of an inflationary environment. 
Whatever the cause, if wages will not fall when other prices are
falling during a significant economic contraction, real wages (wages
adjusted for inflation) will rise. This inability to lower real wages dur-
ing times of weak labor demand might restrict employment and ex-
acerbate the contraction—at least until wages can adjust. 
IN A STEADY STATE
If financial and labor markets are able to completely adjust, a stable
deflation rate induces a positive real return to holding cash. Howev-
er, an economy with stable deflation also incurs many of the same costs
as when inflation is positive—and these costs may be larger than any
gains to cash holders.
All price changes produce some costs.Distortions due to imperfect-
ly indexed contracts or tax codes affect the economy just as much in
deflationary environments as in inflationary ones. If taxes on capital
income are not indexed to inflation, they might discourage investment
in an inflationary environment (taxes would be figured on nominal
returns, including the component reflecting inflation) and encour-
age too much investment in a deflationary period. 
The government can lose revenue when the “inﬂation tax” is reduced.
Since income tax rates are not indexed to prices, deflation lowers tax
rates even if real spending power has not changed. At some point,
those lost revenues must be recovered and other taxes must rise. If the
new taxes distort economic incentives more than the inflation tax, then
deflation increases the inefficiency of the economy. Even when tax
rates are indexed to falling prices, there is an increased government
obligation because the real rate of its outstanding debt is rising as
prices fall.
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There is a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.But perhaps the
biggest steady-state cost of deflation is its effect on monetary policy.
For the most part, monetary policy operates through the central bank’s
ability to control the federal funds rate, which influences a broad ar-
ray of credit market rates, such as Treasury bills, commercial paper,
commercial lending rates, and mortgage rates. When the inflation rate
is positive, as the Fed reduces nominal rates, real interest rates (nom-
inal rates adjusted for inflation) drop as well. It is by lowering the
real interest rate—often into negative territory—that monetary poli-
cy is able to encourage investment and other spending decisions that
help increase production and bring the economy out of recession.
Thus, when an economy with deflation faces a recession, the fact
that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero means the central
bank may not be able to push real interest rates low enough to allevi-
ate the situation. As a result, an economy characterized by deflation
would likely experience considerably greater fluctuations in output
and employment than an economy with stable or rising prices. The
central bank has other policy tools it can use—and these came under
discussion last year when concerns about deflation surfaced. But,
there is some risk associated with relying on these tools since they
haven’t been seriously tested in the post-war U.S. economy.
What prevents nominal rates from falling below zero? The main
reason is that currency pays a zero rate of interest; this places an ef-
fective limit on any drop in interest rates below zero for these other
assets—T-bills, certificates of deposit, etc. If their interest rates be-
gin to fall toward zero, investors find currency an attractive alterna-
tive and increase their holdings of cash. There have been some in-
stances  when  short-lived  liquidity  problems  have  temporarily
produced negative interests, certain Japanese Treasury issues briefly
in the late 1990s, for example. But to date, we have not observed any
assets that have consistently offered a negative nominal interest rate. 
Some have proposed to “solve” this problem by having currency
offer a negative interest rate. That is, at any point its value would be
equal to its face value less accumulated interest. This would allow real
rates on other assets to fall below zero. However, it would make cur-
rency less attractive, as people would have to calculate its worth every
time they made a transaction (similar to trying to pay with a savings
bond). Negative returns would also produce a rush to foreign assets,
which would tend to depreciate the dollar and increase inflation.
CHOOSING THE INFLATION RATE
Some people argue that if deflation is the result of strong productiv-
ity growth, such downward pressure on prices is perfectly acceptable.
Deflation brought on by strong productivity growth might reduce the
transition costs, but it would not reduce the steady state costs. While
an unexpected surge in productivity growth could temporarily put
downward pressure on the inflation rate—as may have occurred in
the late 1990s—there is no reason to accept this unintended defla-
tion as an appropriate long-run resting place. 
In the long-run, monetary policy should be able to move the econ-
omy to any rate of inflation for any rate of productivity growth. Four
percent productivity growth is perfectly consistent with a long-run
inflation rate of 2 percent, 0 percent, –2 percent, or any other num-
ber. Since the Fed can set this rate and most of the costs of deflation
arise even when productivity growth is high, high productivity growth
is not a good reason to incur those costs.
In fact, the central bank is the only actor that can determine, in the
long run, the overall rate of increase of nominal prices. Inflation de-
pends on the balance between aggregate nominal demand and ag-
gregate nominal supply. There is essentially no way for individual
consumers and firms to affect that balance.
Moreover, consumers’ and firms’ well-being depends primarily on
relative prices. Consumers take their income and make purchases
according to their desires and relative prices. It matters less whether
prices and wages are rising at 0 percent or 5 percent, and more whether
the price of hamburger and other things they buy are rising relative
to their wages and other sources of income. Similarly, firms care more
about the differences between input and output prices—wages paid
compared to the price of their product—because this is what influ-
ences their bottom line. While they may care some about inflation,
their primary concern is still these relative price movements.
When the central bank keeps inflation low, it ensures that the sig-
nals given to consumers and firms by relative prices are not confused
by changes in inflation. When inflation is kept low, firms and con-
sumers spend relatively few resources in activities aimed at neutral-
izing the influence of inflation on their economic well-being (think
of the time spent in countries with extremely high rates of inflation
avoiding the effects of inflation on consumer and financial transac-
tions). A significant, sustained deflation would cause both of these
problems. It would also make the conduct of monetary policy much
more difficult when recessions occurred, increasing the costs from lost
output that occur during such downturns. S
Jeffrey Fuhrer is Senior Vice President and Direc-
tor of Research and Geoffrey M.B. Tootell is Vice
President and Economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston.
Core inflation has declined to about 1.6 percent.
annual percent change in core inflation measured by cpi-u
(all items excluding food and energy)













note: Recession periods are defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Low U.S. inflation